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Imagine the following scenario: the City of Abilene, Texas, plans
to construct a broadband cable network that will provide its citizens
with high speed internet access. However, Texas law prohibits munici-
palities from providing telecommunications services.! Undaunted,
Abilene's city planners file a federal complaint alleging that the Tele-
communications Act of 1996, which prohibits states from denying any
entity the right to provide telecommunications service, preempts the
state law.2 Among the issues that a federal court must address in such
a suit are (a) whether Congress has the authority to grant the munici-
pality a cause of action to sue its parent state, and if so, (b) whether
Congress, in fact, has granted such a cause of action. Currently, lower
federal courts disagree about how to resolve these questions.!
The most fundamental disagreement is about whether munici-
palities have a cause of action under federal law to sue. Some circuits
argue that municipalities are political subdivisions of the state, which
the state creates to help it administer its laws. As creator, the state
may modify or withdraw all municipal powers, change municipal
boundaries, or repeal the municipality's corporate charter. Since the
state delegates to municipalities all of their authority, municipalities
lack any independent authority with which to sue the state.
t B.A. 1996, Dartmouth College; J.D. Candidate 2000, The University of Chicago.
See Public Utility Regulatory Act of 1995, Tex Utilities Code Ann § 54.202 (Vernon 1998).
Telecommunications Act of 1996,47 USC § 253(a) (Supp 1997) ("No State or local statute
or regulation, or other State or local legal requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of pro-
hibiting the ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications serv-
ice."). The FCC eventually heard this dispute and ruled that it lacked the authority to preempt
state law, and that since the City of Abilene is not an entity separate from the State of Texas, the
city cannot sue the state. See In re Public Utility Commission of Texas, 13 FCC Rcd 3460,3544
(1997).1 Note that the Eleventh Amendment, which generally prohibits suits against states in fed-
eral courts, does not prohibit municipal suits because the Eleventh Amendment does not pre-
vent federal courts from granting prospective injunctive relief to prevent a continuing violation
of federal law. See Green v Mansour, 474 US 64, 68 (1985), citing Ex parte Young, 209 US 123,
155-56,159 (1908). See also Seminole Tribe of Florida v Florida, 517 US 44,73 (1996); Papasan v
Allain, 478 US 265,277-78 (1986). Such a requirement is intended to maintain the balance be-
tween allowing the "federal courts to vindicate federal rights and hold state officials responsible
to 'the supreme authority of the United States,"' Pennhurst State School and Hospital v Halder-
man, 465 US 89,105 (1984), quoting Young, 209 US at 160, and upsetting the delicate balance of
federal and state interests that is at the heart of the Eleventh Amendment.
. See cases cited in note 28.
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Other circuits have held that municipalities may sue their parent
state to enforce federal law. The basic argument is that occasionally
municipalities are the only parties affected by a state action that vio-
lates federal law. If municipalities cannot challenge preempted state
legislation, such legislation often will go unchecked even though ex-
pressly prohibited by federal law.
The narrower question of justiciability has implications for the
larger debate about the balance of power between the states and the
federal government. A congressional grant of authority that enables
municipalities to sue their parent states would impede the states'
autonomy in administering. their own governments. Municipalities that
previously were beholden to the states for all their power suddenly
would have an independent source of power bestowed upon them by
the federal government.
This Comment offers a new way to approach the question of
whether municipalities may challenge a perceived conflict between
state and federal law. It suggests that the justiciability of municipal
suits is best understood as a question of state sovereignty. First, while
the law is not entirely clear, Congress may lack the constitutional
authority to grant municipalities a cause of action to challenge state
law because such suits would interfere with states' sovereignty. Sec-
ond, even if such a federal cause of action would be constitutional,
widely used principles of statutory interpretation suggest that federal
courts should not recognize a cause of action in the absence of the
clearest of statements from Congress. In addition to bringing the mu-
nicipality cause of action issue into a coherent normative framework,
this new analysis explains the old Supreme Court rule that municipal
suits against their parent states are not justiciable."
Part I discusses the Supreme Court's confusing early decisions on
this issue and the current disagreement about the meaning of these
precedents. This Part adds clarity to the debate by explaining that the
key issue is not whether municipalities have standing to sue, but
whether they have a cause of action to sue.
Parts II and III form the heart of the analysis. Part II shows why
Congress may lack the constitutional authority to grant municipalities
a cause of action against their parent states. Part III argues that in
light of Congress's questionable authority, as well as an absence of any
clear congressional statement in these cases, federal courts should
deny justiciability to municipal preemption challenges.




I. COURT DECISIONS ON THE JUSTICIABILITY OF MUNICIPAL
CHALLENGES TO STATE LAW
A. Foundations of the Doctrine
In a series of cases at the beginning of the twentieth century, the
Supreme Court held that municipalities may not sue their parent
states for constitutional violations.7 However, the meaning of these
cases has caused much confusion for modem courts. In particular,
modem courts disagree whether the earlier cases held that municipali-
ties lack standing or a cause of action to sue.
In Hunter v City of Pittsburgh,8 the Supreme Court sustained
Pennsylvania's decision to merge the city of Allegheny into the city of
Pittsburgh, despite the Allegheny City Council's claims that the
merger violated its citizens' rights under the Contract Clause 9 and the
Fourteenth Amendment. '° The Court dismissed the suit, stating em-
phatically:
Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State,
created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the gov-
ernmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them....
The State, therefore, at its pleasure may modify or withdraw all
such powers ... expand or contract the territorial area, unite the
whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter
and destroy the corporation.... In all these respects the State is
supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the
state constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision
of the Constitution of the United States."
The Court expanded on this logic in City of Trenton v New Jer-
12
sey. In that case, the city of Trenton sued New Jersey arguing that a
state law, which limited the amount of water that municipalities could
divert from the Delaware River, violated its citizens' rights under the
' See Coleman v Miller, 307 US 433,441 (1939) ("Being but creatures of the State, munici-
pal corporations have no standing to invoke the contract clause or the provisions of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the Constitution in opposition to the will of their creator."); Williams v
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 289 US 36,40 (1933) (holding that Baltimore could not sue
to challenge the validity of a state law which exempted a railroad from local taxation); City of
Newark v New Jersey, 262 US 192 (1923); City of Trenton v New Jersey, 262 US 182, 186-88
(1923); Hunter v City of Pittsburgh, 207 US 161 (1907).
207 US 161 (1907).
US Const Art I, § 10, cl 1. The Contract Clause states: "No State shall ... pass any
... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts."
The city claimed that the merger deprived its citizens of their property without due pro-
cess of law by subjecting them to Pittsburgh's higher taxes and violated the contract between the
citizens and the city that their tax dollars would be used only for city purposes. See Hunter, 207
US at 176-77.
Id at 178-79.
262 US 182 (1923).
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Contract Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.1 3 The Supreme
Court held that the city, as a mere "creature of the state," had no
grounds on which to sue:
A municipal corporation is simply a political subdivision of the
State, and exists by virtue of the exercise of the power of the
State through its legislative department. The legislature could at
any time terminate the existence of the corporation itself and
provide other and different means for the government of the dis-
trict comprised within the limits of the former city. The city is the
creature of the State.4
The Court concluded that since the state alone had the authority to
grant a city its powers, the city lacked independent powers with which
to bring the lawsuit:
The power of the State, unrestrained by the contract clause or the
Fourteenth Amendment, over the rights and property of cities
held and used for 'governmental purposes' cannot be questioned.
... This court has never held that these subdivisions may invoke
such restraints upon the power of the State.
15
At first glance, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence weighs heavily
against permitting municipalities to sue their parent states for viola-
tions of federal law. However, it is not clear whether the Supreme
Court refused to hear those cases because the municipalities lacked
standing or because they lacked a cause of action to sue.
B. Rogers and Its Successors: An Unsettled Question Emerges
Some federal courts have read Hunter and Trenton narrowly, re-
fusing to extend their holdings beyond municipal claims brought un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment and the Contract Clause. '6 The most
Before the law came into effect, Trenton had purchased its waterworks from a private
corporation to which the state had granted contractual rights to take unlimited amounts of river
water. The city argued the state law offended the Constitution on two grounds: (1) the act vio-
lated the Contract Clause; and (2) the act took property owned by the city in its private capacity
without just compensation or due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id
at 183-84.
Id at 189-90.
Id at 188. See also Williams, 289 US at 40, in which the Supreme Court, refusing to hear
the city of Baltimore's preemption challenge to a Maryland statute, stated: "A municipal corpo-
ration, created by a state for the better ordering of government, has no privileges or immunities
under the Federal Constitution which it may invoke in opposition to the will of its creator."
Therefore, the Court concluded: "[T]he respondents [are] without standing to invoke the protec-
tion of the Federal Constitution." Id at 47. While the Williams Court spoke in terms of the
"standing" of municipalities to sue, it was actually talking about whether municipalities have a
cause of action to sue. This point will be explained more fully in Part I.C.
" See Branson School District RE-82 v Romer, 161 F3d 619,628-30 (10th Cir 1998) (holding
that Colorado school districts' status as political subdivisions did not deprive them of ability to
[67:243
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important of these later cases is Rogers v Brockette,'7 in which the Fifth
Circuit refused to extend the rule against municipal suits to claims
based on the Supremacy Clause.'8 In Rogers, a Texas school district
sued the state, challenging the constitutionality of a Texas statute that
required school districts to participate in a federally subsidized break-
fast program. '9 In its challenge, the school district claimed that the
Texas statute (which required participation) conflicted with, and
therefore was preempted by, a federal statute (which the plaintiff al-
leged gave school districts the right to refuse to participate), under the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution."0
The Rogers court held that despite the Supreme Court's prior
holdings barring suits against states, the school district could bring the
suit. The court drew a distinction between the question of whether a
municipality has standing to sue and whether it has a cause of action:
We think [the Hunter/Trenton line of cases] are substantive inter-
pretations of the constitutional provisions involved; we do not
think they hold that a municipality never has standing to sue the
state of which it is a creature. In fact, correctly interpreted, these
cases do not deal with "standing," in the sense in which we use
the term.
2 '
bring an action under the Supremacy Clause alleging that federal law preempted state law); City
of Charleston v Public Service Commission of West Virginia, 57 F3d 385,389-90 (4th Cir 1995)
(stating that there is some support for the old rule that municipalities may not sue their parent
states, but that it has been applied mostly in Fourteenth Amendment cases, and that its scope is
in doubt); Amato v Wilentz, 952 F2d 742,754-55 (3d Cir 1991) (noting, while deciding the ques-
tion of third party standing, that the old rule is current law, but acknowledging that support for it
may be waning); Benjamin v Malcolm, 803 F2d 46,54 (2d Cir 1986) (noting that because the city
faced direct injury from the state's alleged conduct, the city has standing to sue); United States v
Alabama, 791 F2d 1450,1455 (11th Cir 1986), citing Rogers v Brockette, 588 F2d 1057,1068 (5th
Cir 1979), for the principle that no per se rule denying municipal suits applies in the Eleventh
Circuit; South Macomb Disposal Authority v Township of Washington, 790 F2d 500,504-05 (6th
Cir 1986) (suggesting that political subdivisions may sue in some circumstances); Rogers, 588 F2d
at 1068 (same); San Diego Unified Port District v Gianturco, 457 F Supp 283,288-89 (S D Cal
1978), affd on other grounds, 651 F2d 1306, 1309 n 7 (9th Cir 1981) (allowing a municipality to
bring constitutional challenges to state law based on the Supremacy Clause). See also City of
South Lake Tahoe v California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 449 US 1039, 1041-42 (1980)
(White dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing that the Ninth Circuit's denial of political
subdivision standing was "inconsistent" with the Court's holding in Board of Education v Allen,
392 US 236 (1968), that a local school board has standing to challenge a state statute requiring it
to lend books to parochial schools); Star-Kist Foods, Inc v County of Los Angeles, 42 Cal 3d 1,
227 Cal Rptr 391, 719 P2d 987, 990-91 (1986) (allowing municipal claims based on the Com-
merce Clause).
588 F2d 1057 (5th Cir 1979).
US Const Art VI, cl 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land.").
" Rogers, 588 F2d at 1059.
Id at 1060.
M Id at 1068.
The University of Chicago Law Review
By interpreting the decisions in Hunter and Trenton as being decided
on the merits, the Rogers court was able to argue that those cases were
not dispositive.u
More importantly, the Rogers court suggested that considerations
of federalism would not stand in the way of a municipal lawsuit:
"There is every reason to think that Congress may interfere with a
state's internal political organization. '
Recently, in Branson School District RE-82 v Romer,u the Tenth
Circuit embraced Rogers and allowed a municipal suit that alleged
that a state law conflicted with a federal law in violation of the Su-
premacy Clause.u The court distinguished the Hunter line of decisions,
arguing that those cases were dismissed on the merits because the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Contract Clause are guarantees of
individual liberty, and municipalities are not individuals under the
meaning of either constitutional provision. 2 In contrast, the Suprem-
acy Clause does not protect individual rights, but rather provides for
the structure of the federal government by imposing a general limita-
tion on state power. The court concluded that the Hunter line of cases
"stand[s] only for the limited proposition that a municipality may not
bring a constitutional challenge against its creating state when the
constitutional provision that supplies the basis for the complaint was
written to protect individual rights, as opposed to collective or struc-
tural rights."'
However, not all circuits have been so easily convinced that mu-
nicipalities should enforce federal law against the states like quasi-
United States Attorneys. As a result, the Rogers line of cases is in di-
rect conflict with the decisions of several other courts.2 For instance, in
Id at 1068-70.
Id at 1070.21 161 F3d 619 (10th Cir 1998).
Id at 628. In Branson, Colorado school districts brought an action against the state to en-
join enforcement of an amendment to the school trust lands article of the Colorado Constitution,
arguing that the amendment violated the Colorado Enabling Act, ch 139, 18 Stat 474 (1875), a
federal law. Id at 626-27.
Id at 629.
Id at 628.
See Palomar Pomerado Health System v Belshe, 180 F3d 1104, 1107-08 (9th Cir 1999)
(holding that political subdivision of the state lacks standing to bring a cause of action against
the state in federal court); Amato, 952 F2d at 755 (finding that county did not have third-party
standing to bring action against Chief Justice of the New Jersey State Supreme Court); Housing
Authority of the Kaw Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma v City of Ponca City, 952 F2d 1183,1188-90
(10th Cir 1991) (holding that a political subdivision may not challenge the validity of an act by
another political subdivision under the Fourteenth Amendment unless the parent state consents
to such an action); Gwinn Area Community Schools v Michigan, 741 F2d 840,844 (6th Cir 1984)
(holding that school district, as a political subdivision of state, could not challenge state action);
City of Safety Harbor v Birchfield, 529 F2d 1251, 1254-55 (5th Cir 1976) (dismissing city's suit
against state legislature for annexation of municipal territory); City of New York v Richardson,
[67:243
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Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority v City of Burbank,
the Ninth Circuit recently held that municipal suits based on a viola-
tion of federal law and the Supremacy Clause are nonjusticiable.4
Citing earlier circuit precedent,'3 1 the court reiterated its interpretation
of the Hunter line of cases as a per se bar to municipal suits against
their states, and refused to make an exception for claims arising under
the Supremacy Clause.3
In a concurring opinion, Judge Kozinski argued that merely be-
cause the Supremacy Clause protects the federal government against
encroachment by the states, it does not follow that municipalities have
a cause of action to enforce a federal law.33 Relying on recent Supreme
Court jurisprudence,'4 Judge Kozinski warned federal courts to pro-
ceed with caution:
Suppose Congress passes a statute and empowers the state's At-
torney General to bring a suit to set aside any state law inconsis-
tent therewith.... Or, what if Congress bestows that power on a
member of his Governor's cabinet, such as the Secretary of
Transportation? ... There is a plausible argument that Congress
may not interfere with the functioning of state officials and in-
strumentalities by endowing them with powers and duties that
conflict with their responsibilities under state law ... The [impact
of federalism] deserves exploration before we carve out a Su-
premacy Clause exception to [the rule against allowing municipal
suits]."
473 F2d 923, 929 (2d Cir 1973) (ruling that political subdivisions of state may not challenge va-
lidity of a state statute under the Fourteenth Amendment); School District of Philadelphia v
Pennsylvania Milk Marketing Board, 877 F Supp 245,250 (E D Pa 1995) (holding that school dis-
trict could not bring action against state milk marketing board in which district alleged that poli-
cies of marketing board violated federal constitution).
136 F3d 1360 (9th Cir 1998).
Id at 1364. In Burbank, California passed a statute that prevented the local airport
authority from expanding without first submitting its plans to the Burbank City Council for ap-
proval. The airport authority, a political subdivision created by the state, brought an action
against the city, claiming that state law unconstitutionally violated the Supremacy Clause by
regulating air safety, an area reserved for federal regulation. Id at 1362.
" City of South Lake Tahoe v California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 625 F2d 231,233
(9th Cir 1980); Indian Oasis-Baboquivari Unified School District No 40 of Pima County, Arizona
v Kirk, 91 F3d 1240, 1243-44 (9th Cir 1996) (denying a school district standing to challenge a
state school funding program as preempted by federal law).
Burbank, 136 F3d at 1364.
Id at 1364-65.
Judge Kozinski refers principally to Printz v United States, 521 US 898 (1997), which pur-
ports to be an absolute prohibition against federal commandeering of state legislative and execu-
tive officials. Id at 933. See also Part II.A.3.b.
" Burbank, 136 F3d at 1365. Despite Judge Kozinski's suggestions otherwise, Printz's prohi-
bition on federal commandeering will rarely be determinative in deciding whether a municipality
may bring a preemption claim. First, Printz involved an explicit congressional command that
2000]
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Judge Kozinski's warning is worth heeding, as considerations of
federalism should inform the results courts reach on this issue. Indeed,
a substantial shortcoming of the earlier cases was their failure to con-
sider the effect that allowing municipal preemption suits would have
on the integrity of the states. Conferring a cause of action upon mu-
nicipalities to sue their states would seriously impede the states'
autonomy in administering their own governments. Municipalities that
were previously beholden to the states for all their power would sud-
denly have an independent federal grant of power. This would weaken
the states' ability to structure their government free from worry that
such a decision might be used by the federal government as a weapon
against them.36 These concerns will be addressed in more detail in
Parts II and III.
C. Standing Versus Cause of Action
As a preliminary point, it should be emphasized that several
courts have mistakenly relied on the Hunter line of cases for the
proposition that municipalities do not have standing to sue their par-
ent state.'7 Trenton and Hunter did refer to "standing." However, when
those cases were decided, "standing" meant only that, on the merits,
the municipality had rights under the particular constitutional provi-
sions it invoked.3 Standing was not seen as the threshold question that
state or local officials must execute a federal program. In contrast, none of the cases examined in
this Comment involve an explicit statement that a local official "must" challenge a state law; in
each case, municipal officials brought the suit voluntarily.
Second, Printz is limited to laws that Congress passes under its Commerce Clause power.
See Printz, 521 US at 936 (O'Connor concurring). Most of the cases in this Comment involve
laws that Congress passed under some other power. For instance, of the three major cases this
Comment discusses, only Burbank involved a law that Congress passed under its Commerce
Clause power. In contrast, in Branson, Congress passed the Colorado Enabling Act under the
Property Clause of the Constitution. Branson, 161 F3d at 635, citing US Const Art IV, § 3, cl 2
("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations re-
specting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States."). And in Rogers, Con-
gress passed the school lunch plan under its power to spend for the general welfare. Rogers, 588
F2d at 1071, citing US Const Art I, § 8, cl 1. See also Gwinn Area Community Schools, 741 F2d at
840 (spending power); Richardson, 473 F2d at 923 (spending power). But see Pennsylvania Milk
Marketing Board, 877 F Supp at 245 (commerce power); Gianturco, 457 F Supp at 283 (com-
merce power); Star-Kist Foods, Inc, 719 P2d at 987 (commerce power).
On its own, it is doubtful how often Printz will serve to prevent municipalities from chal-
lenging the laws of their parent states. However, the policies on which Printz is grounded suggest
that federal courts ought not allow municipal preemption challenges.
For examples of how the federal government can turn a state against itself see Part II.A.3
and the text accompanying note 54.
See, for example, Burbank, 136 F3d at 1363-64; Gwinn Area Community Schools v Michi-
gan, 741 F2d 840, 844 (6th Cir 1984); City of South Lake Tahoe v California Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, 625 F2d 231,233-34 (9th Cir 1980); School District of Philadelphia v Pennsyl-
vania Milk Marketing Board, 877 F Supp 245,250-51 (E D Pa 1995).
Rogers, 588 F2d at 1070 (highlighting the difference between standing and cause of ac-
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it is today. Thus, both Hunter and Trenton stand for the proposition
that municipalities are unable to state a cause of action under the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Contract Clause because those pro-
visions protect the interests of individuals only, not municipalities. Ac-
cordingly, this Comment will examine whether municipalities have a
cause of action to sue their parent state, not whether they have stand-
ing to sue.
In fact, in the majority of the cases discussed in this Comment,
the municipalities satisfy modem standing doctrine, which requires a
plaintiff to satisfy three requirements. First, she must show she has suf-
fered (or is likely to suffer) an "injury-in-fact." Second, there must be
a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained
of. Finally, it must be likely that a favorable decision by the court will
redress the plaintiff's injury.9 In terms of injury-in-fact and causation,
the airport authority in Burbank would suffer a competitive disadvan-
tage if it were not permitted to expand its operations, just as the
school districts in Rogers and Branson would suffer financial hardship
if the respective state laws were enforced. In these cases, the hardship
could be redressed by a judicial determination that the state law is
preempted by a federal law.
However, while municipalities may not lack "standing" in the
modern sense of the term, the question whether municipalities have a
claim on the merits often remains a threshold issue.40 While the
standing/cause of action distinction is not always important to the fi-
tion). See also William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 Yale L J 221, 224-25 (1988)
(identifying modem standing doctrine as a product of the second half of the twentieth century:
"It is at least clear that current standing law is a relatively recent creation. In the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries... no general doctrine of standing existed. Nor, indeed, was the
term 'standing' used as the doctrinal heading under which a person's right to sue was deter-
mined."); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article
111, 91 Mich L Rev 163, 170-80 (1992) (arguing that in the years leading up to the New Deal,
there was no separate standing doctrine).$ See Federal Election Commission v Akins, 524 US 11,19 (1998) (holding that voters seek-
ing information under the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,2 USC § 431(4) (1994), have
standing to challenge agency's decision not to bring an enforcement action); Bennett v Spear, 520
US 154, 162 (1997); Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555,560-561,568-71 (1992) (finding
wildlife conservationists lacked standing to challenge an agency rule because they did not dem-
onstrate that they suffered an injury in fact, nor that their alleged injury was redressable). In ad-
dition, the Supreme Court has held that making generalized grievances against the government
"does not state an Article III case or controversy." See Lujan, 504 US at 573-74. However, in
light of the Court's recent holding in Akins, it is no longer clear what remains of the ban on gen-
eralized grievances. See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informa-
tional Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U Pa L Rev 613, 643-48 (1999) (arguing that while the
Court's decision in Akins limited its previous holding in Lujan, it is unlikely that Akins com-
pletely eliminates the generalized grievance proscription).
I See David P. Currie, Misunderstanding Standing, 1981 S Ct Rev 41,43 ("Whether the an-
swer is labeled 'standing' or 'cause of action,' the question is whether the statute or Constitution
implicitly authorizes the plaintiff to sue.").
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nal result, classifying the two correctly helps to explain why the courts
that refuse to hear municipal preemption suits do not apply modem
standing doctrine.
The real issue then is not standing. Rather it is whether Congress
has constitutional authority to grant a municipality a cause of action
to enforce federal law, and if so, whether Congress has granted such
authority in the particular case. Considerations of federalism and of
the Supreme Court's canons of construction suggest that the answer
to both questions is "no."
II. CONGRESS MAY NOT HAVE THE AuTHORrrY TO GRANT
MUNICIPALITIES AN IMPLIED CAUSE OF ACTION TO SUE THE STATE
It is questionable whether Congress has the authority to grant
municipalities either an express or implied cause of action to sue their
parent states. This Comment refers to implied causes of action be-
cause none of the relevant cases involve an explicit congressional con-
ferral of a cause of action to municipalities. Subpart A considers
whether Congress has authority to grant these causes of action. Sub-
part B suggests that these disputes can be resolved within the state
political process with fewer constitutional problems. Finally, Subpart C
identifies what courts find troubling about refusing to adjudicate mu-
nicipal preemption suits.
A. Congress's Constitutional Authority to Confer a Cause of Action
upon Municipalities to Sue Their Parent States
The failure of both the Burbank and Rogers lines of cases to con-
sider whether Congress has the authority to interfere with a state's in-
temal political organization is a major flaw in their analyses. Such con-
sideration is necessary because the answer to the narrower question of
justiciability has implications on the larger debate about the balance
of power between the states and the federal government. By holding
that a municipality has a cause of action against its state, and suggest-
ing that Congress is able to limit states' control of their municipalities,
the Rogers line of cases has reduced the states' control over their in-
temal governments. Such congressional interference may not be con-
stitutionally permissible.
1. Constitutional text.
The Framers of the Constitution were deliberate in their efforts
to distribute power among various government entities. They struc-
tured the Constitution to allocate power and provide checks and bal-
ances between federal and state government. Nevertheless, the text of
the Constitution provides no basis for finding that municipalities have
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a status independent from that of the state.4 1 In fact, the Constitution
makes no provision for local government at all. As the Court stated
recently in the related context of Eleventh Amendment immunity in
Alden v Maine," "the silence is most instructive. 4 1 The silence of the
text suggests similarly that states' control over municipalities "was a
principle so well established that no one conceived it would be altered
by the new Constitution.""
There are several examples in the text where the Constitution re-
serves powers for the states but makes no reservation of independent
powers for municipalities. For instance, the Tenth Amendment re-
serves the residual powers of government to the "States respectively,
or to the people."45 Among the most important of these residual pow-
ers is state lawmaking authority: states can legislate without first hav-
ing to secure federal permission. In contrast, local governments lack
inherent lawmaking authority: they can only act if the state has
granted them the authority."
Second, Article IV, Section 3 guarantees the states fixed bounda-
ries which cannot be changed without their consent.4 7 In contrast, mu-
nicipalities are subject to a state's decision to change their boundaries
or even to revoke their corporate charter, thus eliminating them en-
tirely.
Finally, the Constitution guarantees that "no new State shall be
formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State.""8 This
provision not only protects the integrity of State borders, but also
guarantees that every citizen will have an allegiance to only one state.
" Consider US Const Amend X (referring only to the federal government, states, and the
people as entities among which governmental power is distributed).
119 S Ct 2240 (1999).
Id at 2260 (arguing that the ratification debates surrounding the Eleventh Amendment
did not include any mention of the Founders' intent to preserve states' immunity from suit in
their own courts because this principle was established beyond question).
" Id.
US Const Amend X.
For instance, states usually prevent or strictly limit localities' ability to legislate to raise
money or regulate core areas of the law such as contract, tort, and criminal law. See Richard Brif-
fault, "What About the 'Ism'?" Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47
Vand L Rev 1303,1339-43 (1994).
US Const Art IV, § 3, cl 1 ("[N]o new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdic-
tion of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts
of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Con-
gress.").
Id.
The Framers were aware that in order to make states an effective balance to federal
power, the states would need to be able to instill loyalty in their citizens. See, for example, Feder-
alist 45 (Madison), in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 290-91 (Mentor 1961) (discuss-
ing the states' comparative advantage in "the predilection and probable support of the people"
as an important check on federal power). In contrast, the Framers did not establish such protec-
tion for municipalities for two reasons. First, based on size, municipalities could not balance fed-
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2. Constitutional structure.
Beyond the text, there are structural reasons to limit federal con-
trol over municipalities. Allowing these suits impedes states' sover-
eignty by giving their municipalities a federal right with which to exert
their wills outside of the states' political process. Doing so may be in-
consistent with the Supreme Court's repeated assertions about the
importance of sovereign states in our federal system.!" States serve as
the repositories of the reserved powers under the Constitution, and
thereby protect citizens from oppression by providing a check on the
powers of the federal government.
Allowing an expansion of municipal power at the expense of the
states would be less problematic if municipalities could provide a
check on federal power as well as states can. However, this is not the
case. Permanent existence, territorial integrity, and inherent lawmak-
ing and fund-raising authority tend to make states more effective po-
litical actors than localities, which lack these qualities.1
The permanence of states also has given them a special role in the
consciousness of citizens. This in turn reinforces their political position
vis-A-vis the federal government. The ability of states to enact laws
and to create lower levels of state and municipal government builds
citizen loyalty to them.53 This is a primary way that allowing a munici-
pal cause of action can weaken the states: states sued by their own
municipalities will suffer a blow to their dignity.m While states do not
eral power effectively, even with the most loyal citizenry. Second, the various forms of municipal
government are generally less important to their citizens and garner less citizen loyalty than do
the states. They are not as static a force in citizens' lives both because their boundaries are sub-
ject to change, and because citizens are often under the jurisdictions of several municipalities,
such as city, county and school district, at the same time. See Briffault, 47 Vand L Rev at 1335-39,
1344-45 (cited in note 46).
See cases cited in note 118.
See discussion in note 49.
Id at 1345-46.
The Framers believed that a state government would secure the loyalty of its citizens by
providing them with the opportunity to become involved in local government:
By the superintending care of [state offices and emoluments], all the more domestic and
personal interests of the people will be regulated and provided for. With the affairs of these,
the people will be more familiarly and minutely conversant. And with the members of these
will a greater proportion of the people have ties of personal acquaintance and friendship.
Federalist 46 (Madison), in Rossiter, ed, Federalist Papers at 294-95 (cited in note 49). To ensure
this political participation at the local level, states need to have the authority to organize the of-
fices provided for the people. See also Federalist 16 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed, Federalist Papers
at 116 ("[State government] must be able to address itself immediately to the hopes and fears of
individuals."); Robert F. Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National League of Cities in
Perspective, 1981 S Ct Rev 81,103 (arguing that the Framers understood that "to be able to pro-
tect themselves in the political process states would need (and were assured under the proposed
Constitution) the capacity to elicit loyalty by providing for the needs of their residents").
The Supreme Court recently endorsed the importance of preserving state dignity in the
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suffer embarrassment in the same sense that people do, they do suffer
a symbolic blow because in the eyes of their citizens the states'
authority has been weakened.5
Granting a cause of action to municipalities weakens the state
from within. This in turn weakens the extent to which the states can
act as a check on federal power.
3. Supreme Court precedent.
Recently, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the importance of
states' autonomy, creating limitations on both federal interference in
states' internal political organization and federal commandeering of
state resources. By analogy, these decisions suggest that Congress may
lack authority to grant municipalities an implied cause of action to sue
their parent states.
a) Interference with the states' internal political organization.
While the Supreme Court has identified constitutional limits on states'
control of their municipalities," it is questionable whether the limits
should enable Congress to provide municipalities with a cause of ac-
tion against their parent states. A fundamental aspect of state sover-
eignty is the states' ability to structure state and local government as
they see fit. This line was drawn as far back as 1911 in Coyle v Smith,"
where the Supreme Court forbade the federal government from or-
dering the State of Oklahoma where to locate its capital.
The Court further elucidated this idea in Gregory v Ashcroft.' In
that case, Missouri state judges challenged a mandatory retirement
provision in the state constitution, arguing that it violated the federal
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967." In upholding the
state provision, Justice O'Connor was persuaded by how important
related context of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence: "The Eleventh Amendment does not
exist solely in order to 'preven[t] federal court judgments that must be paid out of a State's
treasury,' it also serves to avoid 'the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of ju-
dicial tribunals at the instance of private parties."' Seminole Tribe of Florida v Florida, 517 US
44,58 (1996) (citations omitted).
Id.
See, for example, Romer v Evans, 517 US 620,626,629-31 (1996) (holding that Equal Pro-
tection Clause precludes a state from prohibiting local governments from instituting laws de-
signed to protect homosexual persons from discrimination); Kramer v Union Free School Dist
No 15, 395 US 621, 628-29 (1969) (holding that Equal Protection Clause precludes states from
imposing certain limitations on eligibility to vote in school board elections); Gomillion v Light-
foot, 364 US 339,343-45 (1960) (holding that state control of municipalities cannot be used to
circumvent Fifteenth Amendment right to vote). While these cases discuss limitations on state
power, as discussed in Part II.C.1, they are not relevant to the question whether municipalities
should have a cause of action to enforce federal preemption of state law.
221 US 559,565 (1911).
501 US 452,460 (1991).
29 USC §§ 621-34 (1994).
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filling political positions within its government was to the autonomy
of the state:
The present case concerns a state constitutional provision
through which the people of Missouri establish a qualification for
those who sit as their judges. This provision goes beyond an area
traditionally regulated by the States; it is a decision of the most
fundamental sort for a sovereign entity. Through the structure of
its government, and the character of those who exercise govern-
ment authority, a State defines itself as a sovereign.0
The case most closely analogous to the issue of municipal pre-
emption suits is Alden v Maine. In Alden, state officers sued the State
of Maine in its own courts for violation of the overtime provisions of
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)2 The Supreme Court held that
under the Eleventh Amendment, the federal government could not
subject a state to suit in its own courts without the state's consent. Jus-
tice Kennedy warned that states should be able to create subordinate
branches without fear that the federal government would be able to
use them as a weapon against the state:
A power to press a State's own courts into federal service to co-
erce the other branches of the State [ ] is the power to turn the
State against itself and ultimately to commandeer the entire po-
litical machinery of the State against its will and at the behest of
individuals. Such plenary federal control of state governmental
processes denigrates the separate sovereignty of the states.
The offense to state sovereignty that troubled the Court in Alden,
Gregory, and Coyle also looms over the question of municipal pre-
emption suits. Like their courts, states create municipalities to serve a
particular role within the state government. Allowing the federal gov-
ernment to use these state bodies to litigate against the states is as of-
fensive to state sovereignty as allowing the federal government to use
the states' courts against them.
b) Commandeering/unfunded mandates. In some ways, granting
municipalities a cause of action to enforce federal law is similar to the
Gregory, 501 US at 460 (emphasis added), citing Taylor v Beckham, 178 US 548,570-71
(1900) ("It is obviously essential to the independence of the States, and to their peace and tran-
quility, that their power to prescribe the qualifications of their own officers .. . should be exclu-
sive, and free from external interference, except so far as plainly provided by the Constitution of
the United States."). See also Boyd v Nebraska, 143 US 135, 161 (1892) ("Each State has the
power to prescribe the qualifications of its officers and the manner in which they shall be cho-
sen.").
119 S Ct 2240 (1999).
29 USC §§ 201 et seq (1994).
Alden, 119 S Ct at 2264 (citation omitted).
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type of federal commandeering of which the Supreme Court disap-
proves. Like commandeering, allowing municipal preemption suits
forces states to absorb the financial burden of enforcing a federal law.
Two recent cases illustrate the Court's hostility to federal com-
mandeering. First, in New York v United States,6 the Court held that a
federal statute, which gave states a choice of either regulating the dis-
posal of local radioactive waste or "taking title" to it, exceeded Con-
gress's constitutional authority.' The Court was troubled that states
would have to expend their resources to enforce a federal policy.6
With this in mind, the Court determined that the first provision of the
act, which required states to "take title" to radioactive waste,
amounted to a "congressionally compelled subsidy from state gov-
ernments to radioactive waste producers" and, therefore, exceeded
Congress's constitutional authority.67
Likewise, in United States v Printz,6' the Supreme Court held that
the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993 ("Brady Act"), 6
exceeded Congress's authority by commandeering state officials] ° The
Brady Act required state or local law enforcement officers to analyze
information on prospective gun buyers to "make a reasonable effort
to ascertain" whether the prospective buyer could legally own a hand-
gun.7 1 As in New York, the Court was troubled that this federal plan
amounted to an unfunded federal mandate on the states: "By forcing
state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a
federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for
'solving' problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for
the solutions with higher federal taxes."'
The dangers caused by federal commandeering of which the Su-
preme Court warned in New York and Printz are equally applicable to
municipal preemption suits.? Allowing municipal preemption suits
505 US 144 (1992).
Id at 149-50.
Id at 177 ("The [Act] offers a state government no option other than that of implementing
legislation enacted by Congress.").
" Id at 175-76. The Court also held that Congress lacked authority to force states to accept
the second alternative, which was to directly regulate the waste. The Court therefore found that
the act did not present the states with a choice at all, but rather amounted to federal coercion,
stating that "a choice between two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques is no choice
at all." Id at 176.
521 US 898 (1997).
18 USC § 922 (1994).
Printz, 521 US at 935.
1 Id at 903-04.
Id at 930. The Court also argued that federal commandeering of state legislative and ex-
ecutive officials was unconstitutional because it (a) impedes state sovereignty, and (b) leaves
federal officials less politically accountable. Id at 928-30.
" Importantly, the Court in Printz rejected the dissent's distinction between commandeering
of state and local officials. Id at 931 & n 15. See also id at 955 & n 16 (Stevens dissenting) (argu-
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amounts to an unfunded mandate in that it forces states to absorb the
financial burden of enforcing federal preemption claims. If municipali-
ties are denied a cause of action to bring federal preemption claims
against state laws, then the litigation expense of enforcing federal laws
will fall entirely on the federal government.7 4 However, allowing mu-
nicipalities to bring such suits, even voluntarily, shifts the financial
burden of enforcing federal law away from the federal government.
Additionally, crowding state and municipal agendas with federal pro-
grams, and allowing municipalities to enforce them, can limit the ca-
pacity of states and municipalities to pursue their own locally initiated
75
programs.
B. The Political Process: Alternative Dispute Resolution
Municipalities do not need court protection for their interests,
because they are already protected in the state political system. Mu-
nicipalities have been set up by the state to aid in the provision of
services to its citizens and to help the state execute its laws. If there is
a conflict between the state and the municipalities, it amounts to a po-
litical conflict. The state lawmaking process is the exclusive forum for
working out controversies between a state and its municipalities. Citi-
zens are fully represented, and their grievances are resolvable by, the
state legislature. Therefore, there is no judicially cognizable conflict
between the generalized interest of the state and the parochial inter-
ests asserted by local governments.76
Admittedly, state political systems often do not provide munici-
palities with the same structural safeguards that the federal system
provides to the states. While states send Senators to represent their in-
terests, and while the states were originally granted a role in presiden-
tial election by means of the electoral college, municipalities usually
are not represented as municipalities in the state legislatures. How-
ever, the absence of-these structural safeguards in the state political
system is less important in practice. While the city of Chicago may not
ing that the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence distinguished between municipal and
state officials).
" Even without municipal enforcers, federal government attorneys always have standing and
cause to challenge state preemption of federal law. See Part II.C.2.
" See Candice Hoke, Constitutional Impediments to National Health Reform: Tenth Amend-
ment and Spending Clause Hurdles, 21 Hastings Const L Q 489,549 (1994) (suggesting that fed-
eral health care legislation would violate the Tenth Amendment to the extent that it would inter-
fere with the states' control over their political agendas and limit state efforts to engage in ex-
perimentation with new programs).
' But see Michael E. Libonati, Intergovernmental Relations in State Constitutional Law: A
Historical Overview, 496 Annals of Am Acad of Pol & Soc Sci 107, 114-15 (March 1998) (en-
dorsing the holdings of several state supreme courts that municipalities have interests distinct
from the state that cannot be adequately addressed in the state legislature).
[67:243
Municipal Preemption Challenges
have its own state senators, it would be far-fetched to say that it does• • 77
not have a voice in the state political process.
There is evidence that municipalities, currently, are well repre-
sented in the political process. The fact that many states have altered
their constitutions to provide for "local home rule" illustrates that the
state political process is responsive to local preferences.7 Home rule
provides local governments with control over their own affairs such as
taxation and the provision of services. Additionally, several states, re-
sponding to local demand, now consent to suits brought by their mu-
nicipalities. 9 This willingness reflects the municipalities' strength in the
political arena.
The case of Branson exemplifies how intervention by federal
courts can interfere with a well functioning political process and
thereby thwart a state's ability to manage its internal affairs. In Bran-
son, Colorado voters, in a statewide election, approved a ballot initia-
tive to amend the Colorado Constitution.3 However, the coalition that
had campaigned against the amendment and had failed in the political
process then turned to the courts. Unable to show a sufficiently par-
ticularized injury to prove their individual standing, the coalition's
members brought suit in the name of three school districts.8' Their
objective was simple: they would ask a federal court to overturn the
election results and dictate to the state how it could fund its school
system.3 The court agreed to hear the suit on the grounds that the Su-
premacy Clause demands that federal laws always be enforced."
However, by allowing the suit, the court gave a political minority,
which had lost in a statewide election, a second bite at the apple. In
the process, the federal court implicitly acknowledged that it, and not
" See Briffault, 47 Vand L Rev at 1318 (cited in note 46) ("Indeed, despite their formal
status as political subdivisions of the state, most general purpose local governments-counties
and municipalities-are primarily accountable to their local electorates. In practice, they function
as representatives of local constituencies and not as field offices for state bureaucracies.").
Id at 1319 ("The political rallying cry of 'home rule' or 'local control' has frequently been
potent enough to block challenges to local autonomy based on claims of equality, individual
rights, or the external effects of local action.").
' See Richard Briffault, Our Localisn" Part I- The Structure of Local Government Law, 90
Colum L Rev 1,10-11 (1990) (discussing two general models of home rule provisions); Melvin B.
Hill, State Laws Governing Local Structure and Administration 43 (Georgia 1978) (stating that
by 1978 forty-one states had granted at least some home rule authority to their cities).
Among other things, the amendment changed the previous requirement that the Colorado
land board manage its holdings "in such manner as will secure the maximum possible amount"
of revenue for the Colorado public school fund. Instead, the amendment required the land board
to manage its holdings "in order to produce a reasonable and consistent income over time."
Branson, 161 F3d at 626-27. The school districts argued this amendment was preempted by the
federal Colorado Enabling Act, ch 139,18 Stat 474 (1875).
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the state, would decide the proper way for the state to organize and
fund its internal political structure.
Perhaps the court might have decided differently if it had been
privy to the Supreme Court's words in Alden v Maine:
If the principle of representative government is to be preserved
to the States, the balance between competing interests must be
reached after deliberation by the political process established by
the citizens of the State, not by judicial decree mandated by the
Federal Government.'
Instead, the Branson court's decision to allow the municipal suit is an
example of judicial activism that prudential courts should seek to
avoid.!
C. Identifying What Courts Really Find Troubling about Refusing to
Adjudicate Municipal Preemption Suits
1. Fear that state violations of individual rights will
go unenforced.
One misplaced concern is that if municipalities cannot sue their
states, state violations of individual rights will be unenforceable. How-
ever, in most cases, when individual rights are violated, individuals will
have both standing and a cause of action to sue." The only time when
these rights conceivably might be underenforced is when individual
plaintiffs are denied standing because their grievance is not suffi-
ciently particularized. However, to the extent courts find this result of-
fensive, they should reform the standing rules that bar these individual
suits. In fact, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Federal Election
Commission v Akins,n which eased the ban on generalized grievance
claims,2 might be read as the first step in that direction. This approach
is preferable to creating new municipal rights, which weakens state
sovereignty.
119 S Ct at 2265.
See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 Suffolk L Rev 881, 894-97 (1983) (arguing that standing doctrine, by restricting courts
to redressing the injuries of individuals, prevents courts from interfering in the legislative proc-
ess).
Generally, these cases have all involved challenges under the Fourteenth Amendment, for
which Section 1983 provides a cause of action. See 42 USC § 1983 (1994) (allowing recovery
against any person who, "under color" of any state law, subjects another person to the depriva-
tion of any constitutional right).
524 US 11, 24 (1998) ("[W]here harm is concrete, though widely shared, the Court has
found 'injury in fact."').
' See Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555,573-74 (1992) (stating that making a claim
of injury to the "public at large" against the government "does not state an Article III case or
controversy").
[67:243
2000] Municipal Preemption Challenges
Additionally, it does not follow from the fact that the Court has
ruled on the merits of cases like Romer v Evans," Washington v Seattle
School District No 1,9 and Gomillion v Lightfoot,9' that municipal suits
are justiciable." It is true that the Court heard cases like Romer v Ev-
ans on the merits and limited states' control over their municipalities.
However, these cases all involved violations of individuals' Fourteenth
Amendment rights." The issue of the justiciability of municipal suits
was not raised. For instance, in Romer v Evans the question whether
the municipality had a cause of action was passed sub silentio because
there were individual plaintiffs who presented a justiciable case." The
Court did not need to raise the issue whether the municipality was a
valid plaintiff because nothing turned on it."
For situations such as this, the Supreme Court has held that one
cannot infer from the fact that the Court decided a case on the merits
that the issue of jurisdiction has been answered: "[A]s to our own ju-
dicial power on jurisdiction, this Court has followed the lead of Mr.
Chief Justice Marshall who held that this Court is not bound by a
prior exercise of jurisdiction in a case where it was not questioned and
it was passed sub silentio."9" The modern Court has not addressed the
jurisdiction issue of municipal preemption suits, and the Rogers line of
517 US 620 (1996) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause precludes a state from pro-
hibiting local governments from instituting laws designed to protect homosexual persons from
discrimination).
458 US 457,474-82 (1982) (holding that a state may not remove authority over integrative
busing from local school boards).
1 364 US 339 (1960) (holding that a state may not control municipalities to circumvent the
right to vote provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment).
' The Rogers line of cases arrived at a contrary interpretation of these cases. See Rogers, 588
F2d at 1068 (arguing that Gomillion limits the rationale of Hunter to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the Contract Clause); Branson School District RE-82 v Romer, 958 F Supp 1501,1507-
08 (D Colo 1997) (agreeing with courts that have held that standing is appropriate when there
are claims based on the Supremacy Clause), affd, 161 F3d 639 (10th Cir 1998); San Diego Unified
Port District v Gianturco, 457 F Supp 283,290 (S D Cal 1978) (noting that no authority has been
cited for the proposition that an action brought by a political subdivision against a state based on
the Supremacy Clause is barred).
" See, for example, Romer v Evans, 517 US at 632; Seattle School District, 458 US at 476;
Kramer v Union Free School District No 15,395 US 621,631-33 (1969) (holding that Equal Pro-
tection Clause precludes states from imposing certain limitations on eligibility to vote in school
board elections).
Romer v Evans, 517 US at 625.
Additionally, there is a well established canon that counsels the Court to avoid raising dif-
ficult constitutional questions unnecessarily. See Part I.A.
' United States v Los Angeles Tucker Truck Lines, ln4 344 US 33,38 (1952). See also Indian
Oasis-Baboquivari Unified School District No 40 of Pima County; Arizona v Kirk, 91 F3d 1240,
1243-44 (9th Cir 1996) (arguing that the fact the Supreme Court exercised jurisdiction in Wash-
ington v Seattle School District, 458 US 457 (1982), is not precedent for the exercise of jurisdic-
tion, and therefore refusing to entertain school districts' suit for injunctive relief against the State
of Arizona).
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cases misreads Supreme Court precedent to the extent it assumes that
the Court has settled the question.
2. Fear that state violations of federal law will go unenforced.
A second exaggerated concern is that without municipal chal-
lenges, a state action that violates a federal law might remain unchal-
lenged. However, even without municipal enforcers, federal govern-
ment attorneys always will have standing and cause to challenge state
preemption of federal law.
Concededly, it is plausible to imagine a scenario in which munici-
palities are the only parties affected by a state action and federal ex-
ecutive officials fail to bring a preemption claim because they lack suf-
ficient funding, time, or incentive. In these rare cases, courts must de-
cide which is more important: remedying an arguable encroachment
of federal law or respecting states' freedom to organize their political
structure.
Certainly this is not an easy decision, but there are two reasons
for courts to favor restraint. First, when the federal government opts
not to challenge an "encroachment," it is often because the language
of the federal law is ambiguous and, therefore, it is unclear whether it
actually conflicts with state law.9' In these cases, where federal officials
have failed to express an interest in enforcing the "violation" and the
two laws could be read to be in harmony, the costs of allowing these
suits may outweigh the benefits. The main risk is that the municipali-
ties will use the ambiguous federal law as another weapon in their
struggle with the state government. Courts are best advised to let the
local political process resolve these disputes.s
Second, recent Supreme Court decisions suggest that the current
Court may favor respecting state sovereignty over ensuring that every
possible federal claim is enforced. By way of example, consider Alden
v Maine. There, the Court already had ruled that a state's sovereign
immunity meant that the state could not be sued in federal court." As
a result, the Court's decision in Alden closed the only other avenue for
employees to try to force a state to comply with federal law-namely,
by bringing a lawsuit in state court. The Court's decision in Alden thus
Rogers itself is the best example of this phenomenon. In Rogers, the school district sued to
enforce a federal law that contained unclear terms. Rogers, 588 F2d at 1059 ("Congress left it un-
clear whether the choice to participate is to be made by the individual school, the local school
board, or the state."). In the end, the court avoided tough decisions about its invasion of state
sovereignty by interpreting the federal statute in a way consistent with the state law at issue. Id
at 1070-71.
' The Supreme Court's clear-statement rules of statutory interpretation, which will be con-
sidered in Part III, address just such a concern.
" See Seminole Tribe of Florida v Florida, 517 US 44,72-73 (1996) (holding that Congress
lacks power under Article I to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity in federal court).
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leaves enforcement to individual federal agencies, even though gov-
ernment lawyers argued that the Department of Labor does not have
the resources to sue every time there is a complaint."'
Additionally, the Court's refusal in Printz to balance the federal
interest with the burden it imposes on state sovereignty deserves to be
underscored. Instead of considering the federal interest at stake, the
Printz Court emphatically held: "We adhere to that principle today,
and conclude categorically, as we concluded categorically in New
York: 'The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or
administer a federal regulatory program."'10' Both Printz and Alden
suggest that the balance between allowing federal courts to vindicate
federal rights and respecting states' rights to order the processes of
their own governance is tilted, if only slightly, in favor of the states.
III. PRUDENTIAL CONSTRAINTS FOR ARTICLE III COURTS
Even if the Constitution does not prevent Congress from pro-
viding municipalities with an implied cause of action to challenge state
law, federal courts should not interpret federal statutes to have done
so. There are numerous canons of construction designed to limit
courts' involvement in these disputes. Among them are the rule to
avoid constructions of statutes that would raise serious constitutional
problems; the presumption against implying causes of action into fed-
eral statutes; and the rule requiring a clear statement of congressional
intent before a court will abrogate states' sovereignty. Additionally,
there are practical reasons for courts to defer to the state and local
political process.
A. Canon to Avoid Constitutional Questions
The first relevant canon of construction is the rule that courts
should interpret ambiguous statutes in such a way as to avoid constitu-
tional difficulties."' This canon suggests that courts should interpret
federal statutes so as not to give municipalities an implied cause of ac-
tion, thereby eliminating the hard questions about Congress's consti-
Alden, 119 S Ct at 2269.
Printz, 521 US at 933, citing New York, 505 US at 188.
See, for example, Department of Commerce v United States House of Representatives, 119 S
Ct 765,781 (1999) (Scalia concurring) (stating that in the absence of clear congressional intent,
"it is our practice to construe the text in such fashion as to avoid serious constitutional doubt");
Burns v United States, 501 US 129, 138 (1991) (interpreting, in the absence of a clear statement
from Congress to the alternative, Rule 32 of the Sentencing Guidelines in such a way as to avoid
confronting serious questions under the Due Process Clause); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp v
Florida Gulf Coast Building and Construction Trades Council, 485 US 568,575 (1988). See also
Rust v Sullivan, 500 US 173,190-91 (1991) (noting that the canon of avoidance is "followed out
of respect for Congress, which [the Court] assume[s] legislates in light of constitutional limita-
tions").
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tutional authority to confer such a right on municipalities at the ex-
pense of state sovereignty.
Courts seek to interpret ambiguous statutes in a way that avoids
constitutional difficulties for several reasons. First, based on judicial
modesty, courts prefer not to consider constitutional issues when it is
unnecessary to do so. Second, this canon is a clear rule that allows
legislators to anticipate, ex ante, the interpretive regime that courts
will apply to their statutes. This in turn allows legislators to draft stat-
utes more efficiently, since they need not waste time worrying about
how various courts might interpret their language."3 Finally, the canon
is democracy-enhancing, because it forces Congress to address hard
political questions instead of passing them to the courts. Forcing leg-
islators to be clear about their decisions is desirable, because the leg-
islative process involves public scrutiny and participation, and legisla-
tors are the officials who are most accountable to the people.
'4
The Rehnquist Court has used this canon on a consistent basis.'
0
For instance, in Edward J. DeBartolo Corp v Florida Gulf Coast
Building and Construction Trades Council,10' the Court adopted an in-
terpretation of Section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act03
so as to avoid raising any serious First Amendment concerns. Ex-
plaining its choice of interpretation, the Court held: "[W]here an oth-
erwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious consti-
tutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such
problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of
Congress.','°
The prudence the Court has shown in cases like DeBartolo
should serve as a guide for courts deciding the question of municipal
causes of action. Part II demonstrated that the decision whether Con-
gress has authority to confer an implied cause of action upon munici-
palities has weighty constitutional repercussions. Courts should exer-
cise prudence by interpreting the particular federal statute in a way
that does not raise these constitutional questions-namely, by ruling
that the statute does not confer an implied cause of action upon mu-
nicipalities.
" William N. Eskridge, Jr.,Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 276-77 (Harvard 1994) (offering
an economic justification for the canons of construction).
" Id at 286-87 ("The rule makes it harder for Congress to enact constitutionally question-
able statutes and forces legislators to reflect and deliberate before plunging into constitutionally
sensitive issues. ... Ultimately, such rules may even be democracy-enhancing by focusing the po-
litical process on the values enshrined in the Constitution.").
See note 102.
485 US 568 (1988).
'"29 USC § 154(b)(4) (1994).
DeBartolo Corp, 485 US at 575.
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B. Canon against Implied Causes of Action
The next relevant canon of construction is the presumption
against interpreting federal statutes to contain an implied cause of ac-
tion.'° This canon suggests that courts should not read into federal
statutes an implied cause of action for municipalities to enforce fed-
eral law.
Over the past twenty years, the Court increasingly has been un-
willing to find implied causes of action in federal statutes. In Cort v
Ash,"' the cornerstone of the modern doctrine, the Court announced a
four-part approach which focused on legislative intent and determina-
tions of congressional purpose and traditional areas of state regula-
tion."' However, the Court's recent decisions have focused mainly on
congressional intent, stating that a court should not find an implied
cause of action unless there is clear evidence that Congress intended
for the cause of action to exist.112 Justice Scalia has gone so far as to ar-
gue that courts should never infer an implied cause of action.11 3 Al-
though the rest of the Court has not adopted Justice Scalia's view,
many of the Court's recent opinions have refused to find a cause of
action without a plain statement from Congress. 4
" See Virginia Bankshares; Inc v Sandberg, 501 US 1083, 1102-05 (1991); Thompson v
Thompson, 484 US 174, 179 (1988). See also William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip R Frickey, The
Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Foreword. Law as Equilibrium, 108 Harv L Rev 26, 102 (1994) (as-
serting that there is a judicial presumption against implying federal causes of action).
422 US 66 (1975).
The actual four-part test is as follows:
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing
one, several factors are relevant. First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted, that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the
plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to
create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of
the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of
action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States,
so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?
Id at 78 (citations omitted).
See Virginia Bankshares, 501 US at 1102-05 ("The rule that has emerged ... is that recog-
nition of any private right of action for violating a federal statute must ultimately rest on con-
gressional intent to provide a private remedy."); Thompson, 484 US at 179 (noting that the intent
of Congress is the ultimate issue, and that if the intent cannot be inferred from the statute, its
structure, or some other source, then courts should not imply a private remedy); California v Si-
erra Club, 451 US 287,297 (1981) ("The federal judiciary will not engraft a remedy on a statute,
no matter how salutary, that Congress did not intend to provide.").
See Thompson,484 US at 191-92 (Scalia concurring).
See, for example, Suter v Artist M, 503 US 347,363-64 (1992) (refusing to find an implied
cause of action under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act); Thompson, 484 US at
187 (refusing to find an implied cause of action under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act);
Karahalios v National Federation of Federal Employees, 489 US 527,536 (1989) (refusing to find
an implied cause of action under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978).
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Courts endeavor to avoid finding implied causes of action for
several reasons. First, it is extremely difficult to know from the legisla-
tive history what Congress "intended." ' 5 Second, finding an implied
cause of action may violate the constitutional separations of powers.116
Related to this, by creating a cause of action, "a court of limited juris-
diction necessarily extends its authority to embrace a dispute that
Congress has not assigned it to resolve.'
17
Under such a presumption against finding federal statutes to con-
tain implied causes of action, courts considering municipal preemption
suits should have a relatively straightforward decision. None of the
cases that this Comment has considered has involved federal statutes
that contain evidence of congressional intent to provide an implied
cause of action. It is equally unlikely that any future cases will either.
For this reason, courts rarely should find that a federal statute confers
upon municipalities an implied cause of action.
C. Canons Requiring a Plain Statement from Congress Before a
Federal Preemption of Traditional State Functions
Several canons of construction require a clear statement of Con-
gress's intent to abrogate state sovereignty before courts will adopt a
construction that limits states' rights.1'8 Among those most relevant to
'" See Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 Harv
J L & Pub Pol 61, 68 (1994) ("Intent is elusive for a natural person, fictive for a collective
body."); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke
L J 511,517 (arguing that "the quest for the 'genuine' legislative intent is probably a wild-goose
chase"). Consider also Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation" Federal Courts and the Law
16-18 (Princeton 1997) (arguing that the search for legislative intent is license for the incorpora-
tion of judicial policy preferences in statutory interpretation).
The argument is that implied causes of action are not part of the law upon which there
was a bicameral vote by both Houses of Congress, and which was presented to the President for
approval. See US Const Art I, § 7, cl 2 ("Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the
United States."). See also Thompson, 484 US at 191-92 (Scalia concurring). When courts find an
implied cause of action, they are legislating by creating private causes of action that Congress
never addressed. See Conroy v Aniskoff, 507 US 511,519 (1993) (Scalia concurring in the judg-
ment) ("We are governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislators... .'The law as it is passed is
the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken is the act
itself."), quoting Aldridge v Williams, 44 US (3 How) 9,24 (1844); Begier v IRS, 496 US 53,68
(1990) (Scalia concurring in the judgment) ("Congress conveys its directions in the Statutes at
Large, not in excerpts from the Congressional Record."); Easterbrook, 17 Harv J L & Pub Pol at
68-69 (cited in note 114) ("No matter how well we can know the wishes and desires of legisla-
tors, the only way the legislature issues binding commands is to embed them in a law."). But see
John E Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 Colum L Rev 673,702-05 (1997)
(arguing that textualists' contention that the courts' use of legislative history violates Article I's
requirements is in tension with other textualist arguments).
Cannon v University of Chicago, 441 US 677,746 (1979) (Powell dissenting).
See, for example, Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v College Sav-
ings Bank, 119 S Ct 2199,2205 (1999) (noting that in order to determine if Congress had abro-
gated a state's sovereign immunity, a court first must determine if Congress had "unequivocally
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this Comment are the rules against federal preemption or disruption
of traditional state functions,"9 and against congressional expansion of
federal court jurisdiction that would siphon cases away from state
courts. ' O
Like the canons discussed above, these federalism canons provide
legislators with a relatively simple interpretive regime that reduces the
ex ante decision costs for those drafting legislation.21 More impor-
tantly, these canons force legislators to consider the effects their leg-
islation will have on the states. This is particularly important after the
Court's decision in Garcia v San Antonio Metro Transit Authority,
which left the burden of protecting state sovereignty almost entirely
to the political process.'2 In many ways, federalism can be thought of
expressed its intent to abrogate the immunity"); Seminole Tribe of Florida v Florida, 517 US 44,
55 (1996) ("Congress' intent to abrogate the States' [Eleventh Amendment] immunity from suit
must be obvious from 'a clear legislative statement'.") (citation omitted); City of Columbia v
Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc, 499 US 365,374 (1991) (establishing a presumption against ap-
plication of federal statutes to state and local political processes); Atascadero State Hospital v
Scanlon, 473 US 234,239-40 (1985) (recognizing a super-strong clear statement rule against con-
gressional abrogation of state Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits in federal courts);
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v Halderman, 451 US 1, 25 (1981) (holding that conditions at-
tached to federal funding for state programs must be clear). For a comprehensive list of the can-
ons of construction that protect federalism, as well as the Rehnquist Court's other canons of
construction, see Eskridge and Frickey, 108 Harv L Rev at 97-108 (cited in note 109).
' See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc v Norris, 512 US 246,252 (1994) (recognizing that only if Con-
gress manifests a clear purpose will a federal statute be read to supersede a state's historic pow-
ers); BFP v Resolution Trust Corp, 511 US 531, 544-45 (1994) (noting that a federal statutory
purpose must be "clear and manifest" in order to displace traditional state regulation); Cipollone
v Liggett Group, Inc, 505 US 504,516 (1992) (requiring a clear congressional purpose for federal
labeling requirements to preempt state product liability law with regard to cigarettes); Gregory,
501 US at 461-64 (recognizing the authority of a state's citizens to determine the qualifications
of their most important government officials).
" See Kokkonen v Guardian Life Insurance Co of America, 511 US 375,377 (1994) ("Fed-
eral courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Consti-
tution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree. It is to be presumed that a
cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.") (citations omitted); Finley v United States, 490 US
545,552-53 (1989) ("Due regard for the rightful independence of state governments ... requires
that [federal courts] scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the
statute has defined.") (citation omitted).
See Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation at 276-77 (cited in note 103).
469 US 528,554 (1985) (holding that applying the wage and hour protections of the Fair
Labor Standards Act to state employers exceeded no substantive limitation on the Commerce
Clause power).
In justifying its adoption of the clear statement rule, the Supreme Court explained in
Gregory v Ashcroft "[I]nasmuch as this Court in Garcia has left primarily to the political process
the protection of the States against intrusive exercises of Congress' Commerce Clause powers,
we must be absolutely certain that Congress intended such an exercise." Gregory, 501 US at 464,
citing Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 6-25 at 480 (Foundation 2d ed 1988)
("[T]o give the state-displacing weight of federal law to mere congressional ambiguity would
evade the very procedure for lawmaking on which Garcia relied to protect states' interests.").
See also Laurence H. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regula-
tion Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies about Federalism, 89 Harv L Rev 682, 695
(1976) ("[T]he courts should not abrogate state immunity unless they are sure that Congress has
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as an underenforced constitutional norm, abandoned in large part by
the courts, and rarely considered by federal lawmakers. A canon of
construction that requires a clear statement of congressional intent
partially cures the systemic failure of Congress adequately to consider
federalism, by directly forcing members of Congress to consider and
deliberate on legislation that impacts state sovereignty.'u
Two recent Supreme Court cases explain the scope of these can-
ons. The first is Gregory v Ashcroft, in which the Court found that the
control of qualifications for judges is fundamental to state sover-
eignty.' s For this reason, the Court established a clear statement rule
to be applied when courts face questions of federalism: "'it is incum-
bent upon the federal courts to be certain of Congress' intent before
finding that federal law overrides' this balance."'' 6
The Court extended Gregory in BFP v Resolution Trust Corp,12
which involved an interpretation of the phrase "a reasonably equiva-
lent value" for mortgage foreclosure sales under the federal Bank-
ruptcy Code. Justice Scalia, in the majority opinion, rejected various
interpretations of the phrase to mean "fair market value" or "fair
foreclosure price," because these interpretations conflicted with the
state's laws regulating the foreclosure process. While Justice Scalia
conceded that Congress clearly has constitutional authority to regu-
late bankruptcy,2 he was unwilling to interpret the statute in a way
that conflicted with state law without a clear statement of Congress's
intent to do so.'28 BFP thus extended the Gregory rule, which involved
direct federal regulation of state governments themselves, to federal
laws that conflicted with general state regulations12
Gregory and BFP are guides for federal courts deciding whether
to grant municipalities a cause of action to sue their states. Similar to
Gregory, in which the federal law interfered with state laws governing
the structure of its judicial branch, the municipal preemption cases in-
volve federal laws that interfere with the states' ability to structure
considered the federalism interests compromised by suits against states ... [T]he clear statement
rule would further ensure that attempts to limit state power were unmistakable, thereby struc-
turing the legislative process to allow the centrifugal forces in Congress the greatest opportunity
to protect the states' interests.").
See Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation at 286-89 (cited in note 103).
The Court found that this decision "goes beyond an area traditionally regulated by the
States; it is a decision of the most fundamental sort for a sovereign entity. Through the structure
of its government, and the character of those who exercise government authority, a State defines
itself as a sovereign." Gregory, 501 US at 460.
Id, citing Atascadero State Hospital, 473 US at 243.
"511 US 531 (1994).
Id at 543, citing US Const Art I, § 8, cl 4: "The Congress shall have Power ... To establish
... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States."
BFP, 511 US at 539-40.
'"See Eskridge and Frickey, 108 Harv L Rev at 84 (cited in note 109).
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their lower levels of government. After BFP, courts must search for a
clear statement of congressional intent. Thus, without a clear state-
ment from Congress, courts should exercise prudence and refuse to
grant municipalities a cause of action because doing so would come at
the expense of state sovereignty.
D. Other Prudential Reasons to Avoid Hearing These Disputes
Beyond these canons, there are also practical reasons why federal
courts should allow states to maintain their current degree of political
control over municipalities. First, although municipalities theoretically
are one step closer to the people, these small entities may provide a
greater danger to individuals' rights. With their small size and limited
fiscal resources, municipalities are more easily captured by large cor-
porations located within their boundaries.13' Unlike states, with their
larger size and more diverse assortment of employers and taxpayers,
small city governments can become dependent on a corporation's
presence to provide jobs and taxes for the local economy.
Related to this, excessive deference to local power can make it
more difficult for states to remedy racial and financial inequalities
among the various municipalities within a state. Often the areas in
which people settle are largely predetermined based on their race,
class and level of income. Absolute local control of school financing
and zoning can heighten the significance of inter-local wealth differ-
ences and perpetuate inequalities in education, housing, and employ-
ment opportunities.32
Finally, courts should consider the consequences of allowing mu-
nicipalities a cause of action against the state. Allowing causes of ac-
tion would mean not only that municipalities can sue their state, but
also that they can sue other municipalities. Under such a system, the
federal courts would be obliged to decide these disputes between local
governments. The traditional system, in which the state government
oversees its internal affairs as a unified sovereign, works well because
the state can resolve local disputes without involving the courts. A rule
that allowed municipalities to air their grievances in federal court
" See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation through Statutory Inter-
pretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 Colum L Rev 223, 248-49 (1986) (arguing that smaller
legislative bodies that represent fewer constituents are more likely to be overtaken by rent-
seeking special interest groups).
" Briffault, 90 Colum L Rev at 5-6 (cited in note 79).
2000]
The University of Chicago Law Review
would not only be a blow to state sovereignty, but would also entail
enormous administrative costs for the courts.
CONCLUSION
State sovereignty is important to the federal system because
states check the abuse of power by the federal government. One of
the most important aspects of state sovereignty is each state's freedom
to structure its internal political organization without federal interfer-
ence. A congressional grant of an implied cause of action to munici-
palities would seriously impede this autonomy. Municipalities that
were previously beholden to the state for all their power would sud-
denly have independent federal power. This would weaken the states'
ability to structure their government without fear that their decisions
to create municipalities might be used by the federal government as
weapons against them. Furthermore, hearing these suits would weaken
citizens' perceptions of the state as a viable alternative to a strong
federal government.
For these reasons, a convincing argument can be made that Con-
gress does not have the authority to grant municipalities an implied
cause of action to sue their states. Admittedly, the extent to which fed-
eralism protects states' sovereignty is currently unclear. However,
even courts that prefer not to answer such tough questions of federal-
ism should still refuse to allow these cases based on prudence alone.
Several well established canons of construction and practical concerns
suggest that federal courts should leave it to the state system to re-
solve such cases.
